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As all Americans know, the French woman has it all. We dress with class, we don’t get fat, 
we have achieved feminist goals without needing to declare a sex war, and most importantly, 
not only do we keep our jobs while having kids, but our kids are well behaved without any 
conscious effort on our part. While this popular vision is often sustained by a culturalist 
narrative of French womanhood, a more politically aware version of this trope stresses the 
fact that French women’s capacity to have it all is favored by a strong tradition of generous 
policy regarding work/family reconciliation
1
.  
Like all stereotypes, this image contains a part of truth, but it also limits a more precise 
sociological understanding of the contemporary mechanisms of gender inequality in France. 
So what I’d like to do here is to discuss this image of the French “working mom” supported 
by a generous social policy in two ways: first, examine where this policy historically came 
from, and second, revisit the question of its effects on French women. 
*** 
 
Where does this general social policy to support work-family reconciliation come from? As is 
most often the case with feminist policy, the intention was not first and foremost feminist, and 
the mix of provisions which can today be analyzed as forming a supportive work-family 
reconciliation policy were not initially thought of in those terms. Rather, it is the result of a 
sedimentation of measures coming from different policy sectors, following motivations which 
in many cases had nothing to do with feminism.  
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At the turn of the XXth century several provisions within labor law and education policies had 
an important impact on work/family relations, and tended to favor women’s and mothers’ 
labor force participation. 
The changes made to labor law resulted from the fact that, at a time when demographic 
concerns where on the rise throughout Europe, French political leaders took for granted 
working class mothers’ participation in the labor force as a necessary evil, and framed the 
issue in terms of “protection” of working mothers: as Jane Jenson notably stressed, the idea 
was not to prevent mothers from entering the labor force, but to make it possible for working 
women to have as many healthy children as possible.  
Hence the creation of a legally ensured 8 week maternity leave in 1909, to which a daily 
allowance was added in 1913, and this allowance shifted from a system of assistance to a 
system of insurance in 1930, covering the lost wages. The duration of the maternity leave was 
then gradually extended to the current 16 weeks.  Even though these measures were not 
designed by French politicians in a feminist goal but mainly for demographic reasons, they 
resulted in facilitating mothers’ labor force participation. Moreover, this model of the 
“working mother” was mostly circumscribed to the working class: middle and upper class 
women were not encouraged to work on the labor market. 
As far as care for young children is concerned, full-day preschools were developed since the 
middle of the XIXth century. Kim Morgan shows how this development of early childhood 
education can be linked to the fight of secular republicanism against the Catholic church. Here 
again, although the provision was not meant to help women combine child-care and waged 
work, it certainly had that effect. The development of the preschool system also initially 
targeted in priority the working class. 
 
Then after the Second World War, different and contradictory provisions came from another 
policy sector, that of family policy, institutionalized around the defense of a strict model of 
gendered division of labor and pronatalism. At the time, tax incentives and allowances aimed 
at keeping women as care providers at home and encouraged families of at least three 
children.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, this more conservative orientation was, in turn, challenged by the rise 
of both a feminist movement and state feminism, with the creation of women’s policy 
agencies which promoted a new definition of work-family reconciliation as a means to 
women’s equality  
Hence as of the 1970s, new measures were adopted to facilitate women’s labor force 
participation: the child care system expanded, various allowances and tax deductions for child 
care were created. This feminist reorientation of family policy was also encouraged by 
feminist policy at the EU level, which framed work-family reconciliation as a gender equality 
issue as well as an economic issue, the idea being to favor women’s labor force participation.  
But the familialist tradition didn’t cease, and other measures, sometimes also adopted in the 
name of work-family reconciliation, promoted a more traditional view of the family. For 
example in 1985 an allowance was created to fund a long parental leave (up to three years for 
each child), the financial compensation being high enough to create a strong incentive for 
working-class women. While part of family policy, this was also a means for the government 
to decrease unemployment rates by taking these women out of the labor market.  
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So these work-family provisions were also differentiated according to social class, but not in 
the same way as what was the case at the beginning of the century: this time, by means of 
such allowances, working-class women tend to be encouraged to stay home, while the other 
provisions mainly benefit middle and upper class women. 
Recently, this has been reinforced by the general upper-class orientation of gender equality 
policy, focusing a lot on access to power and higher positions in the aftermath of the adoption 
of the parity laws in 2000.  
 
To sum up, the French policy tradition regarding the work-family interface is generally 
characterized by a high level of state intervention, but this translates into different, sometimes 
conflictive orientations. The extent to which it goes towards supporting women’s labor force 
participation depends on a power balance between feminist and familialist actors, and it also 
varies a lot according to social class.  
*** 
 
Therefore the effects of this policy context are not homogeneous, and need to be analyzed 
specifically for different categories of women. Here I will focus on the most privileged 
categories to show how these policies indeed enable them to have rewarding careers, but also 
to show the limits of what these policies do.  
 
I am drawing on a research I took part in, coordinated by Catherine Marry. The research 
addressed gender inequalities in the French higher administration, based on 95 life-story 
interviews with women and men in two ministries, finance and social affairs.  The people we 
interviewed are all top executives in managerial positions within their departments. The 
dominant profile is white, with middle to upper class background, prestigious diploma, and 
rather traditional family situations: most of them are married in heterosexual couples with 
children.  
If we focus on the women and to what extent their careers have been facilitated by the social 
policy context, the very fact that most of them have children and are pursuing fulfilling 
careers is already evidence of the positive impact of French family policy. They all rely on an 
extensive delegation of care work and they are both financially and symbolically supported 
for it – financially by the social policy I described earlier, and symbolically in the sense that 
the social control on motherhood and the pressure regarding “good mothering” is much lighter 
on upper class women, and probably lighter than what it typically is in the US (there so far 
has been a lot less social control regarding breastfeeding for example).  
And yet, the experience is not as smooth and effortless as the stereotype has it. The 
combination of family life and professional life is an issue on many levels for these women: 
the interviews conducted with them are full of anxiety and expressions of exhaustion on the 
subject. Why is that?  
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The main reason is that there is a discrepancy between state-level policies which, as we have 
seen, turn motherhood into a state affair, and organizational policies, norms and practices, 
which remain grounded in a male-breadwinner model and define care as a personal 
responsibility
2
. I will give three illustrations of this. 
 
First, an interesting result of the conflict between state policy and organizational policy is the 
fact that even though it is over a century old, the right to maternity leave still is not entirely 
perceived as an entitlement within the organizational settings we studied. Concretely, women 
feel they need to plan their pregnancies in order to limit their impact on the work 
organization, and several women have worked from home during their legal maternity leave.  
 
Secondly, the day to day time constraints, with often 9am to 9pm work hours, are 
incompatible with parents engaging in any significant involvement in direct care for their kids 
during the week. However, the intensity of this constraint varies from one administration to 
the other: they are much stronger in the finance ministry than at social affairs. But besides the 
day to day organization of care, many respondents complain that the organization makes no 
room for the necessary unpredictable events of childhood life: having a baby-sitter until 9PM 
is not a problem, but having to leave work early for an emergency medical appointment is a 
whole other issue. Here again, the organization does not recognize workers as parents. 
 
Finally, geographical mobility remains an important criterion for career advancement in the 
public as well as in the private sector in many managerial positions, even though some 
equality policies at the organizational level are trying to address this issue. Within a couple, 
geographical mobility often means sacrifying a person’s career in order for the other one to be 
able to move, so this is a good example of the persistence of a single-career (if not single-
breadwinner) model.  
 
Hence one of the main limits of what state policies can do is that they are in contradiction 
with organizational norms.  
 
Our study also shows that there are limits to what these policies do, and maybe to what they 
can do, in terms of promoting gender equality not just in the workplace, neutralizing the 
impact of family responsibility, but in the family itself, in terms of the actual sharing of this 
responsibility.  
Even though there have been some policy attempts to address this, such as the creation of a 
paternity leave, the experience of conducting life-story research with both men and women is 
very revealing in this respect: it is actually for French men that the stereotype holds true. For 
them, work-family reconciliation is effortless, and it just does not come up as an issue in the 
interviews; whereas for women, it is a major concern. And this is also supported by 
quantitative data on a broader scale: today women in France still do twice as much domestic 
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notably as part of the general promotion of “diversity”, but so far these have had very little impact on actual 
organizational norms and practices. 
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work as their male spouses on average, and it is still their labor force participation, not men’s, 
which is challenged by the presence of young children in the family. 
 
And finally, our study points to the limit of a reflection on work-family reconciliation that 
solely focuses on maternity leave and early childhood care. For example, for these upper class 
women, early childhood is not an issue, but they start being concerned when their children 
reach elementary school age. Then they feel they personally need to be there to check 
homework, for example, in compliance with the role of schools in social reproduction. This, 
again, calls attention to the need to situate the social control over mothers in terms of class.  
Moreover, several of them argue that child care and education generally speaking is not the 
issue, but avoiding divorce is more of a preoccupation to them. And indeed, some career 
choices such as refusing a promotion are explained by the fear of divorce much more than by 
an anticipated incapacity to handle childcare issues. Some of the women we interviewed do 
not worry so much about being “bad mothers”, but they do fear losing their spouse. And 
interestingly, this is also a preoccupation for some men, especially men who have already 
been through a divorce: there might be leverage for policy and social change.  
  
To conclude, you will notice that while partly debunking one of the myths Americans have 
about the French, I have also confirmed another: no matter how lucky we are, we keep 
complaining.  
 
 
 
